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COMMENTS 
WHEN INNOCENT DEFENDANTS FALSELY 
CONFESS: ANALYZING THE 
RAMIFICATIONS OF ENTERING ALFORD 
PLEAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 





On August 19, 2011, Damien Echols left death row and faced the 
world for the first time in seventeen years.
1
  Dubbed the “West Memphis 
Three,” Echols, Jessie Misskelley, and Jason Baldwin were convicted of the 
brutal murders of three children in West Memphis in 1994 based on 
Misskelley’s confession.2  They were released from prison after serving 
seventeen years pursuant to plea agreements reached with prosecutors: the 
three defendants entered “Alford pleas,” in which they maintained their 
innocence but agreed that prosecutors had enough evidence to convict.
3
 
In Virginia, meanwhile, twenty-seven-year-old Robert Davis has been 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Washington 
University in St. Louis, 2008.  I would like to thank Professors Steven Drizin and Josh 
Tepfer of Northwestern Law’s Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth for their assistance 
in developing the idea for this Comment.  Special thanks to Professor Laura Nirider of the 
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth for her invaluable suggestions and edits.  I would 
also like to thank the editorial staff of JCLC for their assistance.  I owe immense gratitude to 
my family and friends for their constant love and support.  Thanks in particular to Dave and 
Seth—I love you guys. 
1 See 48 Hours: West Memphis 3: Free (CBS television broadcast Sept. 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7381432n [hereinafter West 
Memphis 3]. 
2 Id. 
3 See ‘West Memphis Three’ Plea Deal? Men Controversially Convicted of Killing Boy 
Scouts Might Be Released, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2011, 9:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/19/west-memphis-three-plea-deal_n_931171.html. 
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sitting in a prison cell for the past eight years.  Charged with arson and the 
murder of a woman and her son, Davis entered an Alford plea in 2004.
4
  He 
was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison.
5
  Davis and his attorney 
maintain that his confession back in 2003 was coerced and Davis never 
committed these crimes.
6
  Because Virginia bars defendants who enter 
Alford pleas from seeking postconviction relief, Davis’s only hope for 
release rests in the hands of Virginia Governor Robert F. McDonnell, who 
has the power to grant executive clemency.
7
 
While the defendants in these cases currently find themselves in very 
different predicaments, these two cases share one common theme: both 
feature defendants who were charged with murder and falsely confessed.  
Thus, each case serves as an excellent lens through which to view the issues 
surrounding Alford pleas in today’s justice system.  Specifically, this 
Comment will analyze the use of Alford pleas in cases where the only 
substantial piece of evidence linking the defendant to a crime is a 
confession. 
The advent of plea bargaining in the legal system in the past century 
has rendered the classic “trial” virtually obsolete.  From 1976 through 2002, 
in terms of percentage of dispositions, state court criminal trials declined 
from 8.5% to 3.3%, bench trials as a percentage of dispositions fell from 
5.0% to 2.0%, and jury trials declined from 3.4% to 1.3%.
8
  While the 
guilty plea “represent[s] the largest share of adjudicated cases in . . . federal 
criminal justice” (95.2%),9 the Alford plea has evolved to encompass a 
small share of adjudicated cases in the United States.
10
  This plea 
arrangement derives from North Carolina v. Alford, in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that guilty pleas by defendants who maintain 
their innocence do not violate due process.
11
 
Numerous scholarly articles have been written about Alford pleas, 
addressing their constitutionality, their place in relation to the traditional 
 
4 See Lisa Provence, Case Not Closed: Special Prosecutor Named in Crozet Murders, 




7 Davis’s clemency petition is pending as of the writing of this Comment. 
8 ROBERT BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 86 (2009). 
9 Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90 (2005). 
10 Allison D. Redlich & Asil Ali Özdoğru, Alford Pleas in the Age of Innocence, 27 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 467, 474 (2009). 
11 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).  I will discuss this case in great 
detail in Part II of this Comment. 
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justifications for punishment, and their perceived accuracy.
12
  This 
Comment will focus specifically on the practical aspects of the Alford plea.  
It will provide insight into the circumstances in which attorneys should not 
recommend that their clients utilize the plea. 
Part II of this Comment provides the history of the Alford plea and the 
recent scholarship and case law surrounding false confessions.  Part III 
discusses the factors leading to false confessions.  It also looks at the advent 
of the Innocence Movement, which has been characterized by growing 
numbers of exonerations of defendants who have falsely confessed.  Part IV 
analyzes the two aforementioned case studies—Echols and Davis.  Through 
the analysis of these cases, it argues that given the strength of the Innocence 
Movement, innocent defendants should not enter Alford pleas in cases 
where the sole piece of evidence is a confession.  Part V summarizes major 
points and provides an overall conclusion to the Comment. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE ALFORD PLEA 
A. NORTH CAROLINA V. ALFORD 
The Alford plea received its name from the 1970 Supreme Court case 
North Carolina v. Alford.
13
  Henry Alford was indicted for first-degree 
murder on December 2, 1963.
14
  Throughout his trial preparations, Alford’s 
attorney interviewed several witnesses who led him to believe Alford was 
guilty and that he would probably be convicted at trial.
15
  While there were 
no eyewitnesses to the actual murder, there were witnesses who swore 
under oath that Alford had taken his gun from his house and stated that he 
was going to kill the victim.
16
  These witnesses said that Alford told them 
that he had killed the victim.
17
  Although Alford maintained his innocence, 
faced with these witness statements and no evidentiary support for his 
innocence claim, Alford’s attorney recommended that he plead guilty to a 
 
12 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The 
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412 (2003) (critiquing Bibas’s 
rejection of Alford pleas and his stance on plea bargaining in general); Stephanos Bibas, 
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of 
Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003); Jenny Elayne Ronis, 
Comment, The Pragmatic Plea: Expanding Use of the Alford Plea to Promote Traditionally 
Conflicting Interests of the Criminal Justice System, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1389 (2010). 
13 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
14 Id. at 26–27. 
15 Id. at 27. 
16 Id. at 28. 
17 Id. 
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lesser charge of second-degree murder.
18
  Alford pleaded guilty to second-
degree murder but stated to the court that he was in fact innocent and that 
he was pleading guilty only to avoid the death penalty.
19
  The judge 
sentenced him to the maximum sentence for second-degree murder—thirty 
years in prison—and Alford appealed on the constitutional ground that his 




In 1965, the state court found that the plea was entered into “willingly, 
knowingly and understandingly” and “made on the advice of competent 
counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case.”21  Alford petitioned 
for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of North Carolina,
22
 which denied the writ based on its 
findings that Alford had “voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead 
guilty,” and then in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.23  A 
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that his plea was 
involuntary because it was motivated by fear of the death sentence.
24
 
The Supreme Court held that there are no constitutional barriers in 
place to prevent a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who 
wants to plead guilty while still protesting his innocence.
25
  The Court 
stated, “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and 
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is 
unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime.”26  The Court also held that a judge can accept the plea only if 
“strong evidence of actual guilt” exists.27  The Court also noted that the 
defendant in this case was represented and advised by competent counsel 
and that there was substantial evidence that tended to demonstrate guilt;
28
 
thus, the defendant “intelligently” concluded that it would be to his 
advantage to plead guilty in order to avoid the death penalty.
29
 
It is also important to note that in its holding, the Court did not give all 
 
18 Id. at 27. 
19 Id. at 28. 
20 Id. at 29. 
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 29–30. 
24 Id. at 30. 
25 Id. at 25. 
26 Id. at 37. 
27 Id. at 37–38. 
28 Id. at 31, 37. 
29 Id. at 37. 
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defendants a legal right to enter Alford pleas; rather, the Court left it to 
individual states and judges to decide whether they want to accept Alford 
pleas.
30
  The Court stated: 
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have 
his guilty plea accepted by the court . . . although the States may by statute or 
otherwise confer such a right.  Likewise, the States may bar their courts from 
accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence . . . which gives 
a trial judge discretion to “refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . .”  We need not now 
delineate the scope of that discretion.
31
 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented, 
focusing on the death penalty aspect of the case.  He stated that Alford’s 
guilty plea was not made voluntarily because he was “so gripped by fear of 
the death penalty.”32 
B. THE ALFORD PLEA ACROSS THE STATES 
The Alford opinion explicitly noted that judges have the right to accept 
this plea, just as they have discretion to accept guilty pleas under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
33
  Currently forty-seven states and 
the District of Columbia accept Alford pleas.
34
  Defendants in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Ohio frequently use the Alford 
plea.
35
  But courts in Indiana, Michigan, and New Jersey have rejected the 
plea.
36
  Even in states that have explicitly accepted Alford pleas, judges still 
maintain discretion to reject the plea.
37
  For example, states such as North 
Carolina, Washington, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin construed Alford pleas 
 
30 See Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for 
the Criminal Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1063 (1987). 
31 Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 
705, 719 (1962)). 
32 Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 Id. at 38 n.11.  
34 See Bibas, supra note 12, at n.52. 
35 Id. at 1377.  Bibas conducted a series of Westlaw searches to determine the number of 
cases involving Alford pleas. 
36 See, e.g., Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983) (holding, “as a matter of law, 
that a judge may not accept a plea of guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and 
maintains his innocence at the same time,” and suggesting that Alford pleas offend public 
policy); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330  (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (stating courts must 
look to the “ultimate guilt or innocence of the pleaders” when accepting a guilty plea); State 
v. Korzenowski, 303 A.2d 596, 597 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (citing with 
approval a New Jersey Supreme Court directive providing that “notwithstanding the recent 
decision in North Carolina v. Alford . . . , except in capital cases, a plea shall not be accepted 
from a defendant who does not admit commission of the offense”). 
37 See Shipley, supra note 30, at 1063. 




Federal courts have consistently discouraged Alford pleas,
39
 and 
federal prosecutors are reluctant to encourage Alford pleas because the 
policy of the U.S Department of Justice discourages them.
40
  In its 
sentencing instructions, the Justice Department observes that the public 
may not approve of prosecutors pushing a defendant who claims innocence 
to plead guilty.
41
  This discouragement is reflected in statistics showing that 




C. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENDANTS WHO ENTER ALFORD 
PLEAS 
In general, defendants use Alford pleas much less frequently than 
traditional guilty or not-guilty pleas.
43
  A 1997 survey of inmates in state 
and federal correctional facilities found that approximately 3% of inmates 
had entered Alford pleas.
44
  When looking only at inmates in state facilities, 
the percentage was significantly higher (6.5%).
45
 
In 2002, Professor Stephen Bibas conducted a Westlaw search for 
cases involving this plea.
46
  He found 2,500 cases that involved Alford 
pleas; 27% of these cases involved sex offenses, 27% involved other violent 
offenses, and 12% involved white-collar offenses.
47
 
From 2003 through May 2004, the Department of Justice conducted a 
 
38 Ronis, supra note 12, at 1400 (“North Carolina interprets the Alford plea to be a 
species of nolo contendere, in which the defendant makes no admission of guilt at 
sentencing.  Wisconsin finds that the assertion of an Alford plea is relevant only during 
sentencing, becoming indistinguishable from a guilty plea in later proceedings.  In Rhode 
Island, trial judges are permitted discretion to accept the plea, which results in criminal 
conviction and may be used later as a distinct sentencing factor, or to estop relitigation of the 
criminal case in collateral proceedings.  Washington only accepts the plea for certain 
crimes—for example, Seattle bans the plea’s application in sexual assault cases except in 
extraordinary circumstances.”  (citations omitted)). 
39 Id. at 1399. 
40 Bibas, supra note 12, at 1380 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
PROSECUTION (1980), as excerpted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 317, 328–29 (1994)). 
41 Id. 
42 See Redlich & Özdoğru, supra note 10, at 469.  
43 See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 




46 See Bibas, supra note 12, at 1376. 
47 Id. 
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survey of inmates in state correctional facilities.
48
  Researchers sampled 
16,152 state inmates; the U.S. Census Bureau interviewed inmates in 
person.
49
  This study found that 949 of these inmates, or 6.5%, had entered 
Alford pleas.
50
  Within the three types of guilty pleas (guilty, Alford, and 
nolo contendere), Alford pleas accounted for 8.5%.
51
  This percentage was 
essentially identical to the percentage of state inmates who had entered 
Alford pleas in 1997.
52
  With this data, two researchers estimated 
population rates and concluded that approximately 76,000 individuals in 
state prison in 2004 entered Alford pleas.
53
  This data also showed that 
approximately 50% of inmates who had used Alford pleas were 
incarcerated for violent crimes, such as murder, sexual offense, and assault; 
about 25% were incarcerated for property crime; 20% were incarcerated for 
drug-related crimes; and 4% were incarcerated for public-order crimes.
54
  
The breakdown is important because it shows that defendants who are 
charged with more serious offenses, and therefore are facing more prison 
time, use Alford pleas at a much higher rate than the average defendant.  
Violent crimes yield lengthier sentences; thus, it is logical to think that 
defendants who are faced with the threat of longer sentences might be more 
apt to plea bargain.  It is also possible that defendants who are charged with 
serious—and oftentimes more heinous crimes—would want to proclaim 
innocence to the court by entering an Alford plea, rather than admit guilt as 
required by a standard guilty plea. 
Moreover, the 2004 Department of Justice study cited above 
specifically analyzed the pleas of inmates who were convicted of murder.
55
  
Of these inmates, 8.5% entered Alford pleas (two percentage points higher 
than the total inmate population).
56
  In the study, out of those convicted of 
murder who entered Alford pleas, 17.6% were released before trial, 20.9% 
received life sentences, and none were sentenced to death.
57
  In contrast, 
12% of those convicted of murder who pleaded guilty were released before 




48 See Redlich & Özdoğru, supra note 10, at 474. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 475. 
51 Id. at 476. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 484. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 473–74. 
56 Id. at 476. 
57 Id. at 477. 
58 Id. 
286 SYDNEY SCHNEIDER [Vol. 103 
For those who pleaded not guilty, 13.9% were released before trial, 45.7% 
received life sentences, and 3.2% were sentenced to death.
59
 
As illustrated in the seminal case of North Carolina v. Alford, the 
Alford plea provides an avenue by which defendants can avoid the death 
sentence;
60
 clearly, some defendants choose this route rather than risking 
entering a plea of “not guilty” and facing harsher sentences and possibly 
death.  
III. THE PHENOMENON OF FALSE CONFESSIONS AND THE ADVENT OF THE 
INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 
It is clear why attorneys whose clients have confessed would seek a 
plea bargain: most people cannot understand why someone would confess 
to a crime that he did not commit.  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the power of confessions as evidence of guilt.
61
  And 
psychologists have also commented on the persuasive power of 
confessions.  For example, in one study, researchers presented mock jurors 
with various types of evidence: circumstantial evidence, eyewitness 
testimony, and testimony that the accused had confessed to the crime.
62
  
The study found that jurors who heard the confession evidence were 
significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty than jurors who heard 
the other types of evidence.
63
 
Because confessions are so powerful in the minds of triers of fact, it is 
no wonder that innocent defendants—and their attorneys—may jump at the 
chance to enter Alford pleas in exchange for a reduced sentence when the 
defendants have falsely confessed.  However, attorneys who represent 
defendants who have falsely confessed must understand the phenomenon of 
false confessions when they consider their plea-bargaining options.  The 
two cases studies presented in this Comment illustrate the problem with 
false confessions.  Both cases concern teenagers whose convictions were 
based in large part on confessions without any corroborating physical 
evidence. 
Why would someone confess to a crime that he did not commit?  It 
 
59 Id. 
60 See 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970). 
61 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (characterizing a confession 
as “the most compelling possible evidence of guilt” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1884) (recognizing that a “voluntary 
confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law”).  
62 Gerald R. Miller & F. Joseph Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their Implications for 
Psychological Research, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 19, 20–21 (Bruce Dennis 
Sales ed., 1977). 
63 Id. 
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seems illogical that someone would utter words of guilt when he is in fact 
innocent.  However, false confessions are an all-too-common reality in 
today’s criminal justice system.  Recent studies indicate that false 




In general, false confessions arise from specific police interrogation 
tactics.
65
  False confessions generally occur as a result of a police 
interrogator’s use of common and well-intended—but pressure-filled and 
psychologically coercive—interrogation techniques.66  In the United States, 
the Reid Technique is the most widely implemented police interrogation 
training tool;
67
 in fact, “over 300,000 professionals in law enforcement have 
been trained to use the Reid Technique over the previous three 
decades . . . .”68  This technique instructs the police “to use coercive and 
deceptive techniques to obtain a confession,” such as “presenting false 
evidence, preventing the suspect from speaking unless he/she is making a 
confession, tricking the suspect into a confession by offering an 
understanding and sympathetic attitude, and minimizing the moral 
seriousness of the crime.”69  These tactics have not only led to guilty 
defendants confessing, but also have been far too effective in eliciting 
confessions from innocent defendants.  For example, scholars have 
uncovered at least 250 interrogation-induced false confessions over the last 
thirty years, and there are likely many more individuals yet unknown who 
have falsely confessed.
70
  In a 2007 survey, law enforcement officers 
estimated that about 10% of all interrogations result in false confessions.
71
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that sophisticated police 
interrogation techniques can produce false confessions.  In 2009, the Court 
found that “there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures 
[associated with custodial police interrogation] can induce a frighteningly 
high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.”72 
 
64 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 902 (2004). 
65 Id. at 908–09. 
66 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010). 
67 Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding 
Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 757, 760 
(2007). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 760–61. 
70 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 243–45 (2008). 
71 Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 67, at 770. 
72 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320–21 (2009) (citing Drizin & Leo, supra note 
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It is safe to assume that the Reid Technique, which is designed to wear 
down and encourage adults to confess, is even more effective on young, 
inexperienced, and highly susceptible defendants such as the ones featured 
in this Comment—especially given the fact that children and adolescents 
“have significant neurological deficiencies [compared to adults] that result 
in stark limitations of judgment.”73  Data on false confessions support the 
idea that young people falsely confess at a much higher rate than adults.  In 
2004, leading experts on juvenile false confession, Steven A. Drizin and 
Richard A. Leo, examined 125 proven false confessions taken between 
1971 and 2002.
74
  They analyzed their sample by age and found that young 
people were significantly overrepresented: 63% of people sampled were 
under the age of twenty-five at the time of their confessions.
75
  Another 
study analyzed the rate of false confessions by age, examining the 
percentage of exonerees who had falsely confessed.
76
  As a general matter, 
the study found that youth are far more likely to falsely confess than adults, 




The movement concerning acknowledgement of the relationship 
between false confessions and actual innocence has gained traction over the 
last decade.
78
  The “Innocence Movement,” which came to the foreground 
in the 1980s and 1990s with the advent of DNA testing and exonerations 
and took hold in the 2000s, “has generally focused on one question: How 
can we maximize the chances of getting the ‘right guy,’ that is, of 
convicting the guilty while acquitting the innocent?”79  The Innocence 
Movement has been characterized by an increase in the number of 




64, at 906–07). 
73 See JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., AM. BAR ASS’N, ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND 
LEGAL CULPABILITY 3 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheck 
dam.pdf. 
74 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 64, at 932. 
75 Id. at 945. 
76 Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 
RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904–05 (2010).  
77 Id. 
78 See Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. 
REV. 1465, 1484 (2010–2011). 
79 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Sentencing Lessons from the Innocence Movement, 21 CRIM. 
JUST. 6, 6 (2006). 
80 Zalman, supra note 78, at 1499 (explaining that the average number of annual DNA 
exonerations “grew from 6 per year between 1989 and 1999, to 18.1 per year from 2000 to 
2009”). 
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scholarship relating to the field, and media and pop culture featuring more 
stories about wrongfully convicted defendants.
81
  And with the advent of 
DNA testing has come the understanding that people do falsely confess at 
alarmingly high rates.  In fact, the Innocence Project found that false 
confessions have figured into 27% of the approximately 301 convictions 
reversed by DNA evidence.
82
   
Acknowledging the unique role that false confessions—particularly 
those given by young people—play in the overall phenomenon of wrongful 
convictions, Northwestern University School of Law launched a separate 
clinic to represent and advocate for wrongfully convicted youth.
83
  In 2011 
alone, the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, in conjunction with 
its partners at the Innocence Movement and the Exoneration Project, as well 
as several private attorneys, played a role in two monumental cases.  Five 
men, dubbed the “Dixmoor 5,” were exonerated after DNA linked other 
men to the crime.
84
  Based on false confessions, these men were convicted 
of rape and murder when they were teenagers and served nearly two 
decades in prison.
85
  Two weeks after the Dixmoor 5 convictions were 
vacated, an Illinois judge vacated the convictions of four defendants, known 
as the “Englewood 4,” who had also falsely confessed to a rape and murder 
when they were juveniles in 1994; recent DNA testing linked the rape and 
murder to a previously convicted rapist and murderer.
86
  In fact, from 
November 2011 to January 2012, Northwestern Law’s renowned Center on 
Wrongful Convictions and its sister project, the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth, played a role in eleven exonerations—the single 
largest collection of exonerations in any three-month period in the history 
of the Innocence Movement.
87
  The majority of these cases featured false 
 
81 Id. at 1491. 
82 Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2012).  
83 Steve Drizin, Why Young People Falsely Confess to Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 
2009, 11:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-drizin/why-young-people-falsely_b 
_307236.html. 
84 See NORTHWESTERN LAW: CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF YOUTH, 
http://www.cwcy.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
85 See Sophia Tareen, Convictions Vacated Against 3 in 1991 Dixmoor Rape, Murder, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2011, 6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/ 
convictions-vacated-again_0_n_1074763.html. 
86 See Steve Mills, DNA Upends 4 Convictions, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2011, § 1, at 4. 
87 News and Events: Center on Wrongful Convictions Celebrates a Banner Year, 
NORTHWESTERN LAW (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/news/newsdisplay. 
cfm?ID=565. 




As the Innocence Movement gains traction, media outlets across the 
country are spreading the idea of false confessions to the general 
population.
89
  The increase in press on the subject has presumably informed 
the public that people do in fact falsely confess and, thus, potential jurors 
are likely to be better informed about the issue.  While confessions will 
undoubtedly still hold weight in the eyes of juries, the Innocence Movement 
has spread awareness and knowledge of the unreliability of confessions 
lacking any corroborating physical evidence. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This Part presents the facts of the cases of the “West Memphis Three” 
and Robert Davis.  It outlines the background of each case and the events 
that led up to the defendants entering Alford pleas.  It then analyzes the 
ways in which the Alford plea has affected each defendant, focusing 
primarily on postconviction remedies and other ramifications for an 
innocent defendant who has essentially pleaded guilty. 
It concludes that Alford pleas should not be used in cases where a 
confession is the primary piece of evidence linking the defendant to the 
alleged crime.  The advent of the Innocence Movement has shed light on 
the unreliability of confessions that lack corroborating physical evidence.  
Given the changing perceptions of false confessions within the mainstream 
media and the general population, it is in the best interest of these 
defendants to plead “not guilty” and preserve their postconviction options 
in the event that they are convicted. 
A. THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE 
On May 6, 1993, the bodies of eight-year-olds Steven Branch, Michael 
Moore, and Christopher Byers were found submerged in a creek in a strip 
 
88 Id. 
89 See, e.g., John S. Adams, ‘Speeding Train’ Interrogations Can Fuel False 
Confessions, USA TODAY (Dec. 26, 2011, 9:39 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/story/2011-12-26/false-confessions-interrogation/52236364/1; Lisa Black & 
Steve Mills, Why Do People Falsely Confess?, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 2010, §1, at 1; False 
Confessions: Silence is Golden, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 2011, at 75; Robert Kolker, “I Did It”: 
Why Do People Confess to Crimes They Didn’t Commit?, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 11, 2010, at 22; 
David K. Shipler, Op-Ed, Why Do Innocent People Confess?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at 
6; The Dr. Phil Show: False Confessions (CBS television broadcast Jan. 9, 2007), available 
at http://drphil.com/shows/show/819/; The Oprah Winfrey Show: Coerced Confessions (CBS 
television broadcast June 9, 2009), available at http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Marty-
Tankleffs-Wrongful-Conviction/2; Katy Welter, The Truth About False Confessions, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katy-
welter/the-truthaboutfalseconfessions_b_865702.html. 
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of woods next to a highway in an area of West Memphis, Arkansas, known 
as “Robin Hood Hills.”90  The boys had been reported missing the night 
before around 8:00 p.m. by Byers’s adoptive father, John Mark Byers.91  
The bodies were found nude, their hands and feet had been hog-tied with 
their own shoelaces, and it was evident that they had been beaten and 
mutilated.
92
  The cause of death was ruled as drowning.
93
  With no other 
leads, the police began to explore the theory that the murders were a result 
of satanic cult activity.
94
  This led them to focus their attention on Damien 
Echols, an eighteen-year-old high school dropout, who wore a lot of black 
and was rumored to engage in satanic rituals.
95
 
A witness named Vicki Hutcherson, the mother of a young boy, 
Aaron, who had claimed to witness the murders, led the police to the door 
of seventeen-year-old Jessie Misskelley.
96
  Aaron’s statements were clearly 
unreliable, as he told various versions of his story that featured many 
inconsistencies.
97
  Misskelley had a very low IQ, and his mental state and 
age made him extremely susceptible to police interrogation techniques.
98
  
Over the course of several hours (transcripts of the interrogation are 
unavailable, although transcripts of the confessions themselves are 
available), Misskelley confessed to seeing Damien Echols and his friend, 
Jason Baldwin, rape and kill the three boys.
99
  However, Misskelley’s 
confession featured many characteristics that experts have identified as 
indicative of a false confession.  For one thing, Misskelley got many of the 
facts of the crime wrong.
100
  For instance, Jessie claimed that he, Damien, 




90 See Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Ark. 1996). 




94 See West Memphis 3, supra note 1. 
95 Id. 
96 Fiona Steel, The West Memphis Three, TRUTV CRIME LIBR., ch. 5 http://www.trutv. 
com/library/crime/notorious_murders/famous/memphis/index_1.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012). 
97 Tim Hackler, ‘They Messed with My Words’: Today, Aaron Hutcheson Isn’t Sure 
What He Saw, ARK. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at 14. 
98 West Memphis 3, supra note 1. 
99 See Jessie Misskelley’s False Confession, FREE WEST MEMPHIS 3 BLOG, 
http://freewestmemphis3.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=
75 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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witnesses proved that the boys were in school all day and the murder did 
not occur until that evening.  He also told police that the three teenagers 
used rope to hog-tie the boys; however, shoelaces were used.
102
 
Jessie Misskelley refused to testify against Jason Baldwin and Damien 
Echols, so prosecutors could not use Misskelley’s confession at Baldwin 
and Echols’s joint trial.103  Defense attorneys later learned that one juror had 
actually read about Misskelley’s confession and told the other jury 
members during deliberations.
104
  Echols and Baldwin were both found 
guilty of first-degree murder.
105
  Baldwin was sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole and Echols received the death sentence.
106
 
During the investigation and trial, HBO began filming a documentary 
about the murders that came to be titled Paradise Lost.
107
  This 
documentary galvanized supporters of the West Memphis Three into action. 
Experienced appellate attorneys were brought into the case.
108
  The three 
defendants petitioned for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence, including DNA-testing results that excluded Misskelley, Baldwin, 
and Echols as donors of genetic material recovered from the crime scene.
109
  
Lower court judges repeatedly denied these petitions.
110
  Finally, in 
November 2010, more than fifteen years after their convictions, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the petitioners’ request for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a new trial was in order; the 
hearing was to take place in October 2011.
111
  However, it was clear that 
there was a great deal of delay built into this process and the West Memphis 
Three would have to languish for years in prison while they awaited the 
outcome of the hearing and a possible new trial. 
In a surprising move, defense attorney Steven Braga contacted the 
State and made an intriguing proposal: the defendants would enter an 
 
102 See LEVERITT, supra note 91, at 11; Misskelley Clarification Statement, June 3, FREE 
WEST MEMPHIS 3 BLOG, http://freewestmemphis3.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=66&Itemid=80 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012). 






109 See Petitioner Damien Echols’s Reply in Support of Motion for a New Trial at 2, 
Echols v. State, No. CR 93-450A (Ark. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2008). 
110 See West Memphis 3, supra note 1. 
111 See Timeline of Events in the West Memphis Three Case, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 24, 
2011), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/timeline-of-events-in-the-west-memphis-three-ca 
se/Content?oid=1888406. 
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Alford plea; in exchange, all three would be released from prison.
112
  The 
State agreed to the deal.
113
 
The decision to accept the deal was not an easy one for the West 
Memphis Three, and particularly for Jason Baldwin, who wanted to fight 
for his innocence and seek a full exoneration.
114
  Damien Echols, on the 
other hand, had been in solitary confinement for most of his prison stay on 
death row; his emotional and physical health were waning.
115
  Therefore, he 
readily accepted the agreement as a means to get out of prison as quickly as 
possible.
116
  Understanding the toll that his stay on death row was having on 
Echols, Baldwin reluctantly agreed to the deal.
117
  On August 19, 2011, the 
three men were freed.
118
 
B. ROBERT DAVIS 
On February 19, 2003, around 8:40 a.m., a neighbor saw smoke 
coming from Nola Charles’s house on Cling Lane in Crozet, Virginia, a 
small suburban town located near Charlottesville.
119
  Upon entering the 
house, firefighters found the charred body of Nola Charles tied to the 
bottom of a bunk bed.
120
  In the upstairs bedroom, they found her three-
year-old son lying dead on the floor.
121
  The medical examiner later found 
that Nola Charles had been stabbed prior to the fire and that she died from 
multiple stab wounds and blunt force trauma to her skull.
122
  Charles’s son, 
Thomas, died from asphyxiation caused by smoke inhalation.
123
 
The subsequent murder investigation led police to nineteen-year-old 
Rocky Fugett and his sister, fifteen-year-old Jessica Fugett, who lived 
across the street from the Charles house.
124
  They ultimately confessed and 
 
112 See Lindsey-Shannon Lee, The West Memphis Three and Their Alford Plea, THE 
JEFFERSONIAN (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.tjsl.edu/the-jeffersonian/news/2011/09/west-
memphis-three-and-their-alford-plea. 
113 Id. 
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falsely implicated seventeen-year-old Tygue Herrmann and eighteen-year-




Davis was arrested just after midnight, on February 22, 2003, 
following the interrogations of Rocky and Jessica Fugett three days 
earlier.
126
  Davis’s confession is one of the most egregious examples of a 
false confession, specifically because of the coercive tactics used by police, 
the contamination of facts, and Davis’s repeated denials and statements of 
inaccurate facts.
127
  Davis’s confession featured classic signs associated 
with false confessions: Robert Davis asserted his innocence seventy-eight 
times during the six-hour interrogation during which police officers 
threatened the death penalty if he did not confess, implied leniency if he did 
confess, fed him key facts of the crime, and made Robert feel entirely 
hopeless.
128
  Moreover, nationally recognized experts on false confessions 
and police interrogation tactics, including Joseph Buckley of Reid & 
Associates, have deemed the confession suspect.
129
 
Rocky Fugett decided that he would not testify against Jessica or Davis 
and entered a guilty plea to two counts of first-degree murder.
130
  In 
November 2005, he was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison.
131
  His 
sister Jessica was initially found incompetent to stand trial but was restored 
to competency.
132
  Jessica went to trial and was found guilty of two counts 
of first-degree murder, arson, and breaking and entering.
133
 
Prosecutors approached Robert Davis’s defense attorneys with a plea 
agreement that stated that the Commonwealth would drop all of the 




127 According to Northwestern University Clinical Professor, Steven Drizin, who is one 
of the country’s leading experts on juvenile false confessions and has written extensively on 
the topic, Davis’s confession is one of the most obvious cases of a juvenile false confession 
that he has ever studied in his decades of research on the subject. 
128 See Lisa Provence, Innocent Kid? Davis Clemency Petition Inches Toward Governor, 
THE HOOK (Mar. 29, 2012, 3:04 AM), http://www.readthehook.com/103091/false-
confession-davis-clemency-petition-heads-governor; Courteney Stuart, McDonnell’s Desk: 
Governor Gets Clemency Plea in Crozet Killings, THE HOOK (Sept. 29, 2012, 5:06 AM), 
http://www.readthehook.com/105326/fugetts-regrets-no-new-charges-2003-slayings-clemen 
cy-davis-still-possible. 
129 Stuart, supra note 128. 
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murder charge of killing Nola Charles and one second-degree murder 
charge of killing Thomas Charles.
134
  Davis accepted the agreement and on 
April 19, 2004, he entered an Alford plea to the two murder charges.
135
  The 
Court imposed a twenty-three-year sentence.
136
 
Rocky Fugett currently resides at Sussex II State Prison.  He has 
signed an affidavit stating that Davis was never involved in the crime, 
recanting his initial statements to the police.
137
 
C. RAMIFICATIONS OF ALFORD PLEAS FOR THE WEST MEMPHIS 
THREE AND ROBERT DAVIS 
These two cases present powerful and thought-provoking scenarios in 
which defendants and attorneys must weigh various factors when deciding 
if they should enter Alford pleas.  The defendants and their attorneys had to 
balance the practical benefits of Alford pleas—freedom in the case of the 
West Memphis Three and a reduced sentence in the case of Robert Davis—
against the legal ramifications of essentially pleading guilty to crimes that 
they did not commit. 
While each defendant made the choice that he felt best served his 
immediate needs at the time of the plea, it is important that innocent 
defendants and their attorneys understand the harsh ramifications of Alford 
pleas as they pertain to postconviction remedies or hopes of proving “actual 
innocence.”  This Part outlines the considerations that attorneys and 
defendants make when deciding whether to enter into an Alford plea.  After 
analyzing the potential benefits and negative consequences of using the 
plea, Part IV argues that, given the recent success of the Innocence 
Movement in spreading awareness about the phenomenon of false 
confessions, a defendant should not enter an Alford plea if the State’s case 
against him rests on a confession lacking any corroborating evidence, such 
as was the case with Robert Davis and the West Memphis Three. 
1. Potential Benefits for Defendants Who Enter Alford Pleas 
Before outlining the specific negative consequences an Alford plea can 
have on defendants, it is important to address the possible benefits that 
could make this plea appealing.  While I argue that defendants should not 
enter Alford pleas in cases featuring false confessions, it is important to 
examine why defendants might feel compelled to do so. 
 
134 See Plea Agreement, Commonwealth v. Davis, No. 16,742-16,748 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
22, 2004) [hereinafter Davis Plea Agreement]. 
135 Id. at 5. 
136 Id. at 6. 
137 See Provence, supra note 119. 
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i. Reduced Sentence 
The possibility of a reduced sentence makes the Alford plea attractive 
to defendants like Robert Davis.  As discussed in Part II of this Comment, 
defendants who are charged with murder and plead guilty or enter an Alford 
plea tend to receive reduced sentences and avoid the death penalty as 
compared to those who plead not guilty.
138
  Innocent defendants and their 
attorneys must weigh the promise of a reduced sentence via plea bargaining 
against the risks associated with pleading “not guilty” and leaving their 
fates in the hands of a judge or jury.  As previously discussed, courts and 
psychologists have found that jurors have historically placed extraordinary 
weight on a confession as evidence of guilt.
139
 
Davis’s sentence, compared to the sentences of the two other 
codefendants who faced similar charges, is illustrative.  Jessica Fugett 
pleaded not guilty and went to trial where she was found guilty of two 
counts of first-degree murder; she was sentenced to 100 years in prison.
140
  
Rocky Fugett entered a guilty plea to two counts of first-degree murder; he 
was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison.
141
  Davis, who was initially 
charged with the same crimes as Rocky and Jessica, entered an Alford plea; 
by the terms of that plea, he was sentenced to only twenty-three years in 
prison.
142
 Clearly, Davis’s Alford plea allowed him to escape a harsher 
sentence. 
Multiple circumstances surrounding this case could have contributed 
to Davis receiving a much lower sentence, even though he was initially 
charged with the same crimes as the Fugetts.  For example, prosecutors may 
have understood that their case rested solely on Davis’s confession, which 
contained factual inaccuracies, and which one expert deemed unreliable.
143
  
Thus, they could have been looking for a way to ensure that Davis was 
convicted without risking a trial.  In contrast, Jessica led police to evidence 
that corroborated her confession; for example, she directed officers to the 
hiding spot of an iron pipe, which was consistent with Nola Charles’s 
injuries.
144
  The plea agreement stated that Davis’s original sentence of 
eighty years had been reduced by fifty-seven years when he entered his 
Alford plea, as the plea agreement stipulated that the Commonwealth would 
 
138 See Redlich & Özdoğru, supra note 10, at 474. 
139 See Miller & Boster, supra note 62, at 20–21. 
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nol-pros every charge except the two counts of murder.
145
  If Davis had 
pleaded not guilty and been convicted, the prosecution may have asked for 
eighty years during the sentencing phase of the trial. 
Davis’s case presents an interesting conundrum, particularly for 
innocent defendants who have falsely confessed.  Davis quickly recanted 
his confession, and his attorney even tried and failed to suppress the 
confession before trial.
146
  Thus, Davis and his attorney were faced with a 
situation in which—if the case had gone to trial—the fact finder would have 
heard Davis’s own admission of guilt.  Even with no physical evidence 
linking Davis to the crime, confessions are extremely persuasive.  Having 
entered his Alford plea, Davis will be out of prison by the time he is forty-
one years old.  While an innocent defendant spending any time in prison is 
an extreme miscarriage of justice, Davis will still have half of his life in 
front of him.  Had he gone to trial, pleaded “not guilty,” and been 
convicted, he could have faced the prospect of spending his entire life in a 
jail cell.  Thus, it is not shocking that Davis and his attorney decided to take 
the plea deal.  However, as previously discussed, much has changed 
between 2003, when this case was tried, and 2012.  The Innocence 
Movement has gained traction, exonerations are happening at a record pace, 
and the mainstream media has alerted citizens to the phenomenon of false 
confessions.
147
  Given the advent of the Innocence Movement, a plea of 
“not guilty” may not pose the same risk today as it did for Davis and his 
attorney. 
ii. Attorney–Client Relationship and Legal Strategy 
The Alford plea also allows a defendant to garner the practical benefits 
of a plea bargain without putting his lawyer in the difficult position of 
asking an innocent client to lie about being guilty. 
Because the defendants in these cases were not only innocent but also 
susceptible teenagers at the time of their arrests, they may have placed even 
more weight on having their attorneys “on their side.”  Trust in the 
attorney–client relationship is of the utmost importance.148  Courts have 
 
145 See Davis Plea Agreement, supra note 134, at 3, 5–6. 
146 See Provence, supra note 119. 
147 See supra Part III. 
148 See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to 
Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1250 (2006) (“Counsel’s view of the defendant, as well 
as the defendant’s trust or mistrust of counsel, plays a role in determining the course of the 
defendant’s representation.”); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?—Guiding Students 
to Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 509, 511 (2008) 
(“Experienced lawyers tend to state their goal as ‘establishing rapport’ by ‘gaining the trust’ 
of the client.  They understand that making a personal connection with the client is essential 
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recognized the importance of trust in the attorney–client relationship, 
especially in criminal cases.
149
  For example, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
It is unlikely that a criminal defendant will have a legal education.  He, therefore, will 
have to rely on his attorney’s advice for the most basic decisions in a criminal trial—
whether to plead guilty, whether to testify, whether to present a defense, and which 
witnesses to call.  If the defendant does not trust his attorney, he may be unwilling to 
follow his attorney’s advice in these important areas.
150
 
It is clear that the attorney–client relationship played an important role 
in Jessie Misskelley’s case, for example.151  Over the course of the 
investigation into the boys’ murders and even after trial, police tried 
numerous techniques to elicit statements from Misskelley and to persuade 
him to testify against the other defendants.
152
  They would “transport” him 
without his attorney’s knowledge and, during the car ride, question him in 
an attempt to elicit inculpatory statements.
153
  Dan Stidham, Misskelley’s 
attorney, stated that police were able to obtain a second confession from 
Misskelley by visiting him without Stidham’s knowledge or consent and 
that this action represented “a conscious, calculated and ongoing attempt by 
the Prosecution to interfere with the attorney/client relationship between 
Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr. and his Court appointed attorneys.”154  At one 
point, after prosecutors had repeatedly visited Misskelley and tried to 
persuade him to testify, Misskelley stood up in a conference room and 
announced that he wished to make a statement in spite of the advice and 
counsel of his attorney.
155
  He then exited the conference room and refused 
 
if they are to be successful in the subsequent representation.”). 
149 See, e.g., McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22 (Alaska 1974) (“Often, the outcome of 
a criminal trial may hinge upon the extent to which the defendant is able to communicate to 
his attorney the most intimate and embarrassing details of his personal life.  Complete 
candor in attorney-client consultations may disclose defenses or mitigating circumstances 
that defense counsel would not otherwise have uncovered.”); Smith v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles Cnty., 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968) (“[T]he attorney-client relationship is not that 
elementary: it involves not just the causal assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate 
process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence 
between the client and his attorney.”). 
150 Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1981). 
151 See Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Prosecutorial Conduct ¶ 6, State v. Baldwin & 
Echols, Nos. CR93-50 and CR93-450A (Ark. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1994) [hereinafter Baldwin & 
Echols Mot. to Dismiss], available at http://callahan.8k.com/wm3/motions/de_jb_motion 
_to_dismiss.html. 
152 See id. ¶ 13. 
153 See id. 
154 Id. ¶ 15. 
155 Brief in Support of Baldwin & Echols Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 151. 
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to talk with his attorneys.
156
 
Clearly, Misskelley was an uninformed, scared defendant who 
struggled to understand that his attorney was looking out for his best 
interests.  His tumultuous relationship with his attorney had a real impact on 
the criminal investigation and the trial. 
The relationship between Robert Davis and his attorney also 
exemplifies the importance of trust in the relationship between a defendant 
and his attorney.  Although Davis confessed, he immediately told his 
attorney that the confession was a lie.
157
  If Davis’s attorney had questioned 
his client’s innocence by demanding that he admit guilt, it could have 
seriously undermined their relationship.  For example, if Davis felt that his 
attorney presumed his guilt, Davis may not have been willing to open up 
and candidly share information with his attorney.  Such information could 
have included important details about his confession, his relationship with 
his codefendants, or his overall state of mind throughout the legal process.  
Thus, the Alford plea allowed Davis’s attorney to reach a plea deal that 
resulted in a reduced sentence for his client.  It also allowed the attorney to 
convey to his client that he believed in his innocence. 
Alford pleas also help stem any potential ethical dilemmas that 
attorneys might face if they advise their clients to lie about their innocence 
in court.  Before Alford, many attorneys believed it unethical to permit 
clients to plead guilty when these clients told their lawyers they were 
innocent.
158 
  Moreover, the Alford plea permits defendants to assert their 
innocence freely rather than admitting guilt solely to obtain a plea 
agreement. Therefore, attorneys are in a better position to determine the 
appropriate legal strategy of the case.  This “full disclosure” assures that 
clients will not have to lie and leave room for the attorney to face 
unexpected surprises at trial.
159
  Moreover, if a defendant is able to maintain 
his innocence, his attorney is in a better position to consider strategically 
the long-term ramifications of accepting a plea agreement.  An attorney 
with an innocent client might have different considerations in mind than an 
attorney with a guilty client; specifically, attorneys with innocent clients 
will have to understand the postconviction ramifications of entering an 
 
156 Id. 
157 See Provence, supra note 119. 
158 See Shipley, supra note 30, at 1073–74 (citing Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 
119 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“[A]n attorney . . . may not counsel or practice such a deliberate 
deception”); United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726, 730 (D. Conn. 1968) (“[D]efense 
attorneys . . . must exercise scrupulous care to see to it that an innocent man does not plead 
guilty.”)). 
159 Shipley, supra note 30, at 1074.  
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Alford plea. 
2. Negative Consequences of Entering an Alford Plea 
i. Limits on Direct Appeal 
Even before defendants attempt to pursue postconviction remedies, 
entering Alford pleas may impede defendants’ access to direct appellate 
review of their sentences.  The Supreme Court has held that defendants can 
enter into a plea bargain in which they waive their right to appeal.
160
  
Consistent with this principle, the courts of appeal have upheld the general 
validity of a sentencing-appeal waiver in a plea agreement.
161
 
Robert Davis did not have a waiver stipulation in his plea 
agreement.
162
  However, Virginia courts have held that, generally, by 
entering a plea of guilty, an accused waives the right to appeal.
163
  The 
rationale behind this notion is that “[a] voluntary and intelligent plea of 
guilty by an accused is . . . a waiver of all defenses other than those 
jurisdictional . . . .  Where a conviction is rendered upon such a plea and the 
punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free of 
jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to appeal.”164  Most states treat Alford 
pleas the same as guilty pleas,
165
 which limits the ability of defendants who 
enter Alford pleas in those states to appeal their cases on the merits. 
ii. Postconviction Remedies 
While the benefits discussed above might look appealing to defendants 
and their attorneys, it is essential that both groups understand the harsh 
 
160 See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203–04 (1995); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).   
161 See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 59 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); 
United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1995). 
162 See Davis Plea Agreement, supra note 134. 
163 See, e.g., Clauson v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 449, 455 (Va. Ct. App. 1999). 
164 Dowell v. Commonwealth, 408 S.E.2d 263, 265 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Savino 
v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990)), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 414 S.E.2d 440  
(1992) (mem.); see also Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267 (holding that when defendant has admitted 
in open court that he is guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 
claims regarding deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to entry of guilty 
plea); Stout v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 288, 291 (Va. 1989) (holding that when accused 
knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, assignments of error challenging constitutionality 
of death penalty were not cognizable on appeal); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 342, 
345 (Va. 1987) (holding that accused appealing death sentence may not complain of 
nonjurisdictional defects that occurred prior to guilty plea). 
165 See Ronis, supra note 12, at 1414 (citing Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22 (2d 
Cir. 2004)). 
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ramifications that Alford pleas have on the available postconviction 
remedies for innocent defendants.  As previously stated, most states treat 
Alford pleas the same as guilty pleas when it comes to postconviction 
remedies.
166
  And many states do not allow a defendant who entered a 
guilty plea or an Alford plea to seek postconviction DNA testing, for 
example.
167
  Moreover, even if a state does not explicitly preclude someone 
who entered an Alford plea or a guilty plea from seeking postconviction 
relief, a judge may be more skeptical when evaluating an actual innocence 
claim from someone who has pleaded guilty, even if that person has 
maintained his innocence. 
Therefore, if any new DNA evidence is found in the case of the West 
Memphis Three, for example, the defendants cannot use this newly 
discovered evidence to seek a new trial or a full exoneration by a judge. 
Rather, after the West Memphis Three entered their Alford pleas, 
prosecutors “declar[ed] the case closed.”168  This also has ramifications for 
the victims’ families.  Assuming that the West Memphis Three are in fact 
innocent, as so many have to come to believe, the true perpetrator(s) of the 
crime will likely never be brought to justice.  No more public investigations 
will be done and no new leads will be explored. Echols, Baldwin, and 
Misskelley will remain the convicted killers of Christopher Byers, Michael 
Moore, and Steven Branch unless the Governor of Arkansas grants them 
clemency.  As previously mentioned, the West Memphis Three’s cases are 
procedurally unique because their Alford pleas were entered years after 
their convictions as a means of securing release for the defendants.  
However, while the West Memphis Three are currently out of prison, they 
are not fully exonerated in a legal sense. 
Regarding the case of Robert Davis, under Virginia Code § 19.2-
327.2, a defendant who has pleaded “not guilty” and who has acquired 
newly discovered evidence not reasonably known to him at the time of trial 
could seek relief upon a claim of actual innocence.
169
  However, Virginia 
treats Alford pleas as identical to guilty pleas when it comes to the available 
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postconviction remedies for defendants who enter this plea.  Therefore, 
Davis cannot seek relief upon a claim of actual innocence.  His only chance 
for relief rests in the clemency process and is consequently solely in the 
hands of Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell.
170
  Given Virginia’s track 
record with clemency, as exemplified by the “Norfolk Four” case,171 
Davis’s path to freedom will be very difficult. 
Generally speaking, the clemency process is a bit of a mystery to legal 
scholars, as “[s]urprisingly little is known about how clemency is used in 
practice.”172  In fact, very few states have developed clear statutory or 
administrative guidelines that pertain to the clemency process,
173
 leading to 
the view that the clemency process is “arbitrary” and a “flawed vehicle for 
achieving justice.”174  Davis’s likelihood of receiving clemency looks even 
bleaker given the data surrounding executive pardons at the state level.
175
  
The number of state pardons has fallen in recent decades, with most states 
averaging fewer than one hundred commutations per state between 1995 
and 2003.
176
  As mentioned above, the arbitrary nature of the clemency 
process stems in part from the inherent political nature of the process.  
Many politicians “remain afraid of soft-on-crime accusations . . . should an 
individual on the receiving end of a pardon or commutation go on to 
commit another crime.”177  A real-world example of clemency’s effect on 
politics came in the 2008 Republican presidential primary when a television 
advertisement for Mitt Romney stated: 
Two good men.  But who is ready to make tough decisions?  Mike Huckabee?  Soft 
 
170 Id. §§ 53.1-22953.1-231; see also Pardons, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.com 
monwealth.virginia.gov/JudicialSystem/Clemency/pardons.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
171 See, e.g., Pardons in “Norfolk Four” Case Fall Short, INNOCENCE BLOG (Aug. 6, 
2009 5:47 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Pardons_in_Norfolk_Four_Case_ 
Fall_Short.php. 
172 Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its 
Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003). 
173 See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 604–11 (1991). 
174 See Daniel Kobil, Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency Cases, 28 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 567, 567 (2000). 
175 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of 
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1365 n.146 (2008). 
176 See id. at 1349 n.79 (citing Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency 
Decisions?, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 16, 36–37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser 
Hussain eds., 2007) (referencing a survey of all commutations from 1995 to 2003 that found 
that “most states averaged fewer than one hundred commutations per state, with thirty-four 
states . . . having dispensed twenty or fewer”)). 
177 Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 153, 153 (2009). 
2013] ALFORD PLEAS AND INNOCENCE 303 
on government spending.  He grew a $6 billion government into a $16 billion 
government.  Backed in-state tuition benefits for illegals, and granted 1,033 pardons 
and commutations, including 12 murderers.  His foreign policy?  “Ludicrous,” says 
Condoleezza Rice.  Mitt Romney held spending down below inflation.  Cut taxes.  
Zero pardons.  The difference?  Strong leadership.
178
 
Given the trends regarding clemency and the possible negative political 
ramifications, it is no wonder that Obama has granted clemency on fewer 




iii. Collateral Estoppel (Civil Suits) 
Another negative ramification of entering an Alford plea is that a 
defendant’s Alford plea “generally forecloses him from relitigating the 
issue of his guilt in subsequent civil cases arising from the same 
facts . . . .”180  In contrast to a nolo contendere plea, in which collateral 
estoppel will not apply because the defendant accepted punishment without 
charges being litigated or determined, an Alford plea has been properly 
pleaded and determined.
181
  As discussed above, the limitations on 
postconviction remedies make exoneration difficult for defendants who 
enter Alford pleas, thus making civil suits extraordinarily unlikely in these 
cases. 
The West Memphis Three and Robert Davis are now precluded from 
bringing civil suits against the government.  In fact, prosecutors in the West 
Memphis Three case, when discussing why they decided to enter into the 
plea agreements actually cited the concern that if the men were exonerated 
at trial they could potentially sue the state for millions.
182
 
Furthermore, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have 
laws that allow exonerated defendants who have proven their actual 
innocence to recover money from the state automatically.
183
  Virginia, 
where Robert Davis’s case is set, has a statute in place that would have 
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allowed Davis to file a petition for a certificate of innocence and receive 
compensation from the state.
184
  Conversely, the West Memphis Three 
would not have been able to petition for a writ of actual innocence—even if 
they had been exonerated—because Arkansas does not have a state 
compensation law in place.
185
 
iv.  Effects on Sentencing and Parole Decisions 
“Sentencing, probation, and parole decisions often hinge on whether a 
transgressor accepts responsibility and expresses contrition for his 
crimes.”186  In fact, when issuing a sentence, a court can actually view 
expressions of remorse as evidence that the lawbreaker is less deserving of 
harsh punishment and less likely to reoffend.
187
  Five states specifically 
address remorse as a mitigating factor,
188
 and other states actually view lack 
of remorse as an aggravating factor at sentencing.
189
  Defendants who enter 
Alford pleas by definition do not show remorse because the pleas revolve 
around defendants’ assertions of innocence.  Courts across the country have 
nonetheless refused to exempt defendants who enter Alford pleas from an 
assessment of remorse during their sentencing.  For example, courts in 
Georgia, Idaho, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin all treat Alford 
defendants the same as those who plead guilty or not guilty during the 
sentencing phase of the trial.
190
  By the very nature of the plea, a defendant 
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who has entered an Alford plea has failed to show remorse because he is 
professing his innocence. 
Moreover, expressions of innocence in front of a parole board will 
most likely have a deleterious effect on the prisoner’s chance of getting 
paroled.
191
  For example, Daniel Medwed found that “surveying state parole 
release decisions demonstrates that a prisoner’s willingness to ‘own up’ to 
his misdeeds—to acknowledge culpability and express remorse for the 
crime for which he is currently incarcerated—is a vital part of the parole 
decision-making calculus.”192 
v. Alford Pleas Undermine the Credibility of the Justice System 
Accepting a plea of guilty from someone who maintains his innocence 
undermines the credibility of the justice system.
193
  The criminal justice 
system is designed to punish only those who are morally blameworthy, and, 
therefore, the conviction of an innocent defendant threatens the very 
foundation of our system of justice.
194
  This critique of the Alford plea came 
to the fore in the case of the West Memphis Three.  The State entered into 
this plea agreement and agreed to the release of these three men from prison 
even though the State still maintained that the West Memphis Three were 
guilty.
195
  Dan Stidham, Jessie Misskelley’s former attorney and current 
Arkansas State District Court Judge, reflected on the plea agreement, 
stating, “[w]hile this Alford plea allowed justice to happen, there’s no honor 
in it.”196  Stidham faults the state of Arkansas for taking eighteen years to 
“correct [its] mistake,” and notes that when it finally did, it did so “in a 
cowardly fashion with no honor.”197  Stidham, one of Jessie Misskelley’s 
closest confidants—a man who spent eighteen years fighting for Jessie’s 
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freedom—is “happy [Misskelley and the others are free],” but he would 
“rather have won the case in the courtroom.”198 
In the same vein, the use of the Alford plea can also cause the public to 
lose confidence in the criminal justice system because “[t]he public may not 
understand how a party can proclaim innocence in a courtroom, yet be 
convicted on a guilty plea.”199  People may fear that there is inherent 
corruption in a system that seems to place little importance on seeking truth 
or justice.
200
  The West Memphis Three case exemplifies this potential 
effect of the Alford plea; many members of the public may have wondered 
why these men were set free even though they were still considered guilty 
by the state of Arkansas.  People who believe in the men’s guilt expressed 
outrage that these so-called child murderers were being set free
201
 while 
people who believe in their innocence expressed outrage that they were not 
being exonerated.
202
  For many citizens, the use of the Alford plea in this 
case and in general made “the coercion and injustice [of the criminal justice 
system] too obvious to deny.”203 
Conversely, it could be argued that Alford pleas actually benefit the 
criminal justice system, rather than undermine it, because they shed light on 
potential misconduct within the system.  For example, in accepting Alford 
pleas from the West Memphis Three, prosecutors may have actually caused 
the public to lose more confidence in the State, rather than to lose 
confidence in the innocence of the defendants.  Maybe allowing, or even 
encouraging, Alford pleas will have the somewhat perverse result of 
actually strengthening the justice system by highlighting its inherent flaws 
and inefficiencies to a public that cannot understand why our system would 
allow an innocent person to plead guilty. 
Inherent in this overall point on justice is the tragic injustice done to 
the innocent defendant who enters an Alford plea and goes to prison for a 
crime he did not commit.  This potential result requires all participants in 
the justice system—judges, lawyers, and defendants—to examine critically 
a system that would let a person who actively professes innocence plead 
guilty.  In this Comment, I have discussed some of the pros and cons of 
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allowing and encouraging this type of plea, but at the heart of the matter 
rests one of the underlying principles of our criminal justice system: “it is 
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”204 
V. CONCLUSION 
When determining how best to advise their clients, attorneys must 
carefully balance the consequences of their innocent clients pleading not 
guilty—and the related prospects of a risky trial and a possible higher 
sentence—against the negative postconviction consequences of entering an 
Alford plea.  Ten years ago, innocent defendants who had confessed might 
have been reluctant to plead “not guilty”—and with good reason—given the 
persuasive power confessions had over juries.  However, the Innocence 
Movement has changed the way society views confessions that lack 
corroborating evidence.  The mainstream media has latched onto this issue 
and disseminated information about DNA exonerations and false 
confessions to the public.  People are finally starting to understand how 
someone could confess to a crime he did not commit.  It is in this context 
that defendants and attorneys must now analyze their plea-bargaining 
strategies. 
There are many avenues by which defense attorneys can persuade 
juries that—in this age of innocence—a defendant who has confessed is in 
fact innocent.  The smartest strategy for a defense attorney would be to get 
the confession thrown out pretrial based on voluntariness. Some scholars  
have argued that judges should also take into consideration the reliability of 
the confession during the suppression hearing by examining factors such as: 
1) [W]hether the confession contains nonpublic information that can be independently 
verified, would only be known by the true perpetrator or an accomplice, and cannot 
likely be guessed by chance; 2) whether the suspect’s confession led the police to new 
evidence about the crime; and 3) whether the suspect’s postadmission narrative “fits” 
(or fails to fit) with the crime facts and existing objective evidence.
205
 
Another option would be for defense counsel to call an expert on false 
confessions to testify during the trial.  Dan Stidham actually employed this 
technique during Jessie Misskelley’s trial; he called Richard Ofshe, an 
expert on false confessions, to testify to jurors about why Misskelley’s 
statement was likely coerced.  However, Dr. Ofshe was not permitted to 
testify to his opinion that the confession was involuntary because such 
testimony would contradict the judge’s previous ruling that Misskelley’s 
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Cases such as those of Robert Davis and the West Memphis Three 
contained unique circumstances that affected the attorneys’ plea-bargaining 
decisions.  However, these cases, and cases featuring false confessions in 
general, shed light on the harmful effects of an innocent defendant pleading 
guilty.  The West Memphis Three will never get to contest their innocence 
in court; they will remain convicted felons and carry this label with them on 
every job interview, every loan application, and every media appearance.  
Moreover, Robert Davis sits in prison; his only hope of freedom lies in the 
volatile clemency process.  While this Comment argues that lawyers who 
represent an innocent defendant should not counsel their client to enter this 
plea in a case where a confession is the sole piece of evidence, the difficulty 
and enormity of this decision must be acknowledged.  Although the 
Innocence Movement has educated many people on the reality of false 
confessions, there is a real possibility that if Robert Davis or Jessie 
Misskelley were on trial today solely on the basis on their confessions, a 
jury could find them guilty.  How do you tell your client that you are 
essentially rolling the dice with his life because you think you can convince 
a jury that his confession is false?  As has been discussed in this Comment, 
the better bet for most lawyers who represent clients in these types of cases 
is to enter a plea of not guilty and allow the case to play out in the system, 
rather than enter an Alford plea and potentially limit a client’s 
postconviction remedies.  However, there is no guarantee that justice will 
be done for an innocent defendant who enters a plea of not guilty. 
A better solution could lie in the judicial system itself.  Maybe judges 
should refrain from accepting such pleas when the evidence of guilt is based 
solely on a confession, instead of leaving this important decision up to an 
attorney.  Or maybe as educated citizens, we should place more political 
pressure on prosecutors to refrain from bringing a case against a defendant 
based solely on a confession that exhibits classic signs of coercion and 
contamination.  No matter the solution, one thing is clear: it is an utter 
travesty for our justice system to allow innocent defendants to sit in prison 
or to fail to give a defendant who has been released on an Alford plea the 
ability to clear his name.  
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